

AIRPROX REPORT No 2010016

Date/Time: 9 Mar 1655

Position: 5148N 00008W (1nm SE
Panshanger - elev 250ft)

Airspace: ATZ (Class: G)

Reporting Ac Reported Ac

Type: C172 BH06

JetRanger

Operator: Civ Trg Civ Pte

Alt/FL: 800ft↑ 1000ft
(QFE) (N/K)

Weather: VMC CLBC VMC CLBC


Visibility: >10km 8km

Reported Separation:

Nil V/150m H Not seen

Recorded Separation:

100ft V/0-1nm H



PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

THE C172 PILOT reports flying a cct familiarisation training sortie at Panshanger on RW11 LH cct and in communication with Panshanger Radio, squawking 7000 with Mode C. The visibility was >10km below an overcast sky; the cloud base was significantly above cct height, and the ac was coloured white/orange with the anti-collision light switched on. On climbout RW11 heading 110° at 70kt the student lowered the ac's nose to perform a look-out check whereupon the student noticed, and brought to his attention, a helicopter at approximately his 11 o'clock range 0-75nm, slightly higher than themselves entering the ATZ on a crossing SW'ly track from L to R. He made a radio call to ascertain whether the helicopter was on frequency but received no response. As the helicopter showed no signs of changing its flightpath, he urged his student to turn crosswind early to avoid a potential collision; the helicopter was maintaining a constant bearing. As they turned L climbing through 800ft QFE the helicopter passed down their RHS at the same level, allowing him a good view of it from his RH seat and close enough to read its registration. It appeared the helicopter, a blue/white JetRanger with strobe lights on, did not deviate from its course throughout. Having established that the helicopter had flown through the ATZ with no radio contact, he called Farnborough N LARS to enquire whether the JetRanger pilot was working them. The reply was negative but the helicopter was showing on radar squawking 7000 so he asked for them to track it to establish where it landed. Shortly after this Panshanger Radio told him that Farnborough had called by telephone stating the helicopter had landed at Elstree. He asked the A/G operator, another instructor, to telephone Elstree and verify the registration and type, which was confirmed. He assessed the risk as low.

THE BH06 JETRANGER PILOT reports flying enroute to Elstree VFR and in receipt of a BS from either Essex Radar or Elstree. The visibility was 8km in VMC and the helicopter was coloured white/blue with strobe lights switched on. About 5nm N of Elstree, he thought, heading 230° at 90kt and 1000ft, a passenger thought he saw an ac pass behind. There was a break in the cloud above them and the sun was directly in their forward view. He called the ATSU he was working and they stated that they knew of no other traffic; therefore the matter was concluded at that point.

UKAB Note (1): Met Office archive data provided METARs for Luton and Stansted: - EGGW 091650Z 03013KT 350V050 9999 FEW022 BKN048 06/02 Q1028= and EGSS 091650Z 01012KT 9999 SCT024 BKN040 06/01 Q1028=

UKAB Note(2): The UK AIP at AD 2-EGLG-1-1 Para 2.17 ATS Airspace defines the Panshanger ATZ as a circle radius 2nm centred on the longest notified RW (11/29) 514807N 0000930W from SFC to 2000ft aal; elev 250ft amsl.

UKAB Note (3): The Rules of the Air Regulations Rule 12 Flight in the vicinity of an aerodrome states '*(1) Subject to paragraph (2), a flying machine, glider or airship flying in the vicinity of what the commander of the aircraft knows, or ought reasonably know, to be an aerodrome shall; (a) conform to the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft intending to land at that aerodrome or keep clear of the airspace in which the pattern is formed; and (b) make all turns to the left unless ground signals otherwise indicate. (2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply if the air traffic control unit at that aerodrome otherwise authorises.*'

UKAB Note (4): Rule 45 Flight within aerodrome traffic zones states during the notified hours of watch of the air/ground radio station Para (5) '*...the commander shall obtain information from the air/ground communication service to enable the flight to be conducted safely within the zone.*' Para (6) states '*The commander of an aircraft flying within the aerodrome traffic zone of an aerodrome shall; (a) cause a continuous watch to be maintained on the appropriate radio frequency notified for communications at the aerodrome; or (b) if this is not possible, cause a watch to be kept for such instructions as may be issued by visual means; and (c) if the aircraft is fitted with means of communication by radio with the ground, communicate his position and height to theair/ground communication service at the aerodrome on entering the zone and immediately prior to leaving it.*

UKAB Note (5): Analysis of the Debden radar recording at 1654:03 shows a 7000 squawk, believed to be the BH06, 2.7nm ENE of Panshanger tracking SW indicating unverified altitude 1000ft LON QNH 1029mb. The BH06 continues on a steady track and is seen to enter the Panshanger ATZ at 1654:27. Six seconds later a 7000 squawk appears, believed to be the C172, 0.5nm SE of Panshanger tracking 110° and showing unverified altitude 400ft QNH with the BH06 in its 11 o'clock range 1.6nm and 500ft above. The ac continue on converging tracks, the radar showing the C172's Mode C levelling-off at altitude 800ft QNH at 1654:51 with the BH06 in its 1130 position at range 0.7nm. The next sweep 6sec later shows the C172 commencing a L turn, the subject ac separated by 0.4nm with the BH06 100ft above. The CPA occurs on the next sweep at 1655:03, the ac passing starboard to starboard, the BH06 showing 900ft QNH, 100ft above the C172 with lateral separation of 0.1nm. Thereafter the BH06 passes 0.9nm SE abeam Panshanger whilst the C172 continues its climb on a NE'ly track crosswind for RW11.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available included reports from the pilots of both ac and radar video recordings.

The radar recording shows that the incident took place within the Panshanger ATZ; this is airspace that is clearly marked on the 1:500000 and 1:250000 charts and is there for the protection of cct traffic. The onus was on BH06 pilot to take due regard of the airspace by either remaining clear or by calling on the Panshangar frequency to obtain information prior to entering the ATZ to comply with Rule 45 of Rules of the Air Regulations. This was not done and had clearly caused the Airprox.

The C172 student saw the converging BH06 on a constant bearing and alerted the instructor who elected to turn crosswind early whilst maintaining visual contact with it, leading to the BH06 passing close down their RHS at the same level. The BH06 pilot apparently did not see the C172 climbing out from RW11 as no flightpath deviation can be seen. The early visual acquisition and action taken by the C172 pilot allowed the Board to conclude that any risk of collision had been quickly and effectively removed.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: The BH06 pilot entered the Panshangar ATZ contrary to Rule 45 and flew into conflict with the C172.

Degree of Risk: C.